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due process rights had been violated. The court looked to the Supreme Court’s landmark
procedural due process case Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Corporation4 which,
although not a bankruptcy case, defined procedural due process requirements and enunciated
principles of general application. However, the Motors Liquidation court acknowledged that
although there are requirements to be met for procedural due process to be satisfied, the standard
is still a flexible one dependent upon on the facts and circumstances of every case.5
Part I of this article details the Mullane court’s understanding of procedural due process
rights and requirements in a general sense. Part II discusses the application of Mullane’s
principles in the bankruptcy context by the Motors Liquidation court as well as other federal
courts. Part III explores the current state of the law regarding procedural due process
requirements and its interaction with various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. This article
concludes that a court’s determination of whether procedural due process requirements have
been met depends largely on the exigency of the circumstances and the practicality of actual
notice to interested parties.
II.Mullane and Constitutional Procedural Due Process Requirements.
In Mullane, the Supreme Court evaluated the adequacy of notice given to trust holders
whose trusts were compiled into common trusts under New York law.6 These common trusts
were set up under the theory that small or moderate size trusts would be undesirable for large
corporate entities to administer, so the trusts were allowed by law to be compiled together to
make one larger trust for investment administration.7 Income, capital gains and losses would all
be shared proportionally among the common trust constituents.

4 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
5 See Motors Liquidation, 529 B.R. at 546.
6 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309.
7 Id.
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Central Hanover Bank established a common trust by combining 113 trusts and naming
itself as the common trustee.8 While the number of beneficiaries, or their residences, was not
known, at the very least some of them were not New York residents.9 Notice of the bank’s
actions was given by publication in a local newspaper, the bare minimum required under New
York law.10 Only later, after the first investment had been made, was actual notice provided to
trust fund beneficiaries that the bank was aware of.11 The appellant, a beneficiary, appeared and
objected that the notice given was inadequate under the Fourteenth Amendment.12 The
objections to notice were overruled.13 A final decree was entered by the Supreme Court, New
York County, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division, First Department, and the New
York Court of Appeals.14
In reversing the judgment, the Supreme Court outlined the basics of procedural due
process. An elementary and fundamental element of procedural due process was “notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”15 Notice also had to
convey required information and “afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their
appearance.”16
Importantly, the mere gesture of giving notice is not enough if the form of notice given is
not likely to actually inform an individual of the pendency of the proceedings.17 A person needs

8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 309-10.
11 Id. at 310.
12 Id. at 311.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 314.
16 Id.
17 See id. at 315.
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sufficient information to choose to “appear or default, acquiesce, or contest.”18 Notice did not
have to be perfect, but appropriate under the circumstances of the case.19 As long as an
individual interest was represented in some capacity, that may be enough.20
III.Application of Mullane in Bankruptcy Proceedings.
Mullane established the principle of a case-by-case analysis of the adequacy of notice. In
applying Mullane, courts have had to determine whether or not the facts and circumstances of a
given case have justified the use and specificity of the notice given or lack thereof.21 A clear
pattern that has emerged, however, is that both procedural due process and statutory due process
requirements must be met in order to enforce a sale order or confirmation plan.22
A. In re Motors Liquidation Company.
In In re Motors Liquidation Company, several classes of plaintiffs sued General Motors
(“GM”) for personal injuries and property damage sustained due to an ignition switch defect in
their vehicles that GM knew about as far back as 2003.23 On June 1, 2009, GM filed for chapter

18 Id. at 314.
19 See id. at 314-15.
20 See id. at 319. The Mullane court stated:
The individual interest does not stand alone but is identical with that of a class. The rights of each
in the integrity of the fund and the fidelity of the trustee are shared by many other beneficiaries.
Therefore notice reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to
safeguard the interests of all, since any objection sustained would inure to the benefit of all. We
think that under such circumstances reasonable risks that notice might not actually reach every
beneficiary are justifiable.
21 See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., 995 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Notice may satisfy due process
without setting forth verbatim the full text of a proposed settlement; it may describe the settlement in general
terms.”); In re Polycel Liquidation, Inc., No. 00-62780 (RTL), 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4545, at *23-26 (Bankr. D.N.J.
Apr. 18, 2006) (“And while it is undisputed that Pool Builders learned of the bankruptcy proceedings from another
supplier prior to the execution of the sale, this is not sufficient knowledge to satisfy the due process requirements.”).;
Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 962 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Denver was not served with that notice, and there is no indication
that it knew about it, which means that Denver would not have known how to compute the bar date--and so was
entitled to notice of that date.”).
22 See, e.g., Miller v. Cappuccilli (In re Cappuccilli), 193 B.R. 483 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (vacating a default
judgment against a debtor on procedural due process grounds due to ineffective service of process).
23 529 B.R. at 521-22, 528.
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11 bankruptcy due to a steep decline in revenues, operating losses, and decreased liquidity.24
When GM filed for bankruptcy protection, at least 24 then GM employees knew about the
ignition switch defect.25
Given the fact that the Treasury Department gave GM only 60 days to come up with a
viable plan to ensure GM’s survival, GM sought to sell its assets in a section 363 sale to an entity
that would later become the new GM.26 After hearing objections to the section 363 sale and its
free and clear provision,27 GM’s bankruptcy was resolved on July 10, 2009, creating the new
GM.28 Plaintiffs only received notice of the hearings by publication.29 It was not until the
spring of 2014 that GM finally acknowledged the ignition switch issue and recalled vehicles with
the ignition switch defect.30
After publicly announcing the ignition switch defect in March 2014,31 several class
action lawsuits asserting successor liability claims were brought against GM.32 In response to
the class action lawsuits, GM sought to enforce the free and clear33 provision of the 363 sale
order.34 Plaintiffs countered by alleging that their procedural due process rights were
violated.35 GM responded by asserting that procedural due process requirements did not apply
because there was no deprivation of property.36 The bankruptcy court disagreed with GM and

24 Id. at 529-30.
25 Id. at 525.
26 Id. at 530-31.
27 Id. at 531-32.
28 Id. at 534.
29 Id. at 535.
30 Id. at 538.
31 Id. at 521.
32 Id. at 539.
33 See 11 U.S.C. 363(f)
34 Motors Liquidation, 529 B.R at 538-39.
35 Id. at 539.
36 Id. at 550.
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held that procedural due process requirements do apply, and examined whether those
requirements were met.37
In regards to the accident victims whom GM was unaware of, the court found that notice
by publication was proper because actual notice to either the 27 million people with some defect
requiring a recall then or in the future, or the 70 million owners of all GM vehicles, would have
been impractical given the dire financial situation GM found itself in.38 However, notice by
publication for the plaintiffs in the Motors Liquidation case was held to be insufficient, because
GM was aware of the ignition switch defect and knew that those vehicle owners would qualify as
known claim holders.39
However, the mere fact that actual notice was due to the plaintiffs was not enough to
establish a violation of the plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights, as the plaintiffs also had to
show that they suffered prejudice as a result of the lack of actual notice.40 The bankruptcy court
found that most classes of plaintiffs suffered no prejudice, because the arguments plaintiffs were
making had previously been considered and rejected during GM’s bankruptcy, provided no basis
to reconsider any prior rulings, and called for speculation as to political factors.41 In fact, the
bankruptcy court found that Mullane expressly stated that the presentation of an argument by one
among many with a shared interest, as had happened in Motors Liquidation,42 could protect the

37 See id. at 555.
38 See id. at 556.
39 See id. at 560.
40 See id. at 560-565.
41 See id. at 526, 573.
42 Id. at 566.
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interests of all.43 Ultimately, only one class of plaintiffs, the “Economic Loss” class, was
prejudiced in a way that allowed the court to provide some relief.44
B. Western Auto Supply Company v. Savage Arms (In re Savage Industries).
In Western Auto Supply Company v. Savage Arms (In re Savage Industries),45 a firearms
manufacturer had declared bankruptcy, and attempted to sell its assets to a newly incorporated
corporation.46 In approving the asset transfer, the bankruptcy court “prescribed safeguards for
interests held by objecting creditors,” but did not “require[] court approval of the asset-transfer
terms” negotiated or “[make] provision[s] for the interests of holders of contingent product
liability claims” against the firearm manufacturer.47 The asset transfer went through, and the
new corporation continued manufacturing the same firearms.48 A consumer that was injured by
a firearm prior to the bankruptcy sued the retailer that sold it, who in turn brought a third-party
action against the new corporation under a theory of successor liability.49 The new corporation
sought to enjoin the third-party action based on the disposition of the bankruptcy case.50 The
bankruptcy court enjoined the action, but was reversed by the district court.51
In affirming the district court, the First Circuit held that lack of adequate notice to
claimants of the chapter 11 proceedings was a violation of their procedural due process rights.52
The First Circuit stated that notice was “the cornerstone underpinning Bankruptcy Code
procedure” and that it was the responsibility of the debtor-in-possession to ensure that all “parties
43 See id. at 543.
44 See id. at 575. (“The Plaintiffs could have made overbreadth arguments if given appropriate notice before the 363
Sale hearing, and to that extent they were prejudiced. And for that the Plaintiffs should be entitled to remedial relief
to the extent the law otherwise permits.”).
45 43 F.3d 714 (1st Cir. 1994).
46 Id. at 717.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 718.
51 Id. at 719
52 Id. at 720.
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

in interest” had adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to a proceeding that
would be adverse to their interests.53 As no attempt was made in the case to give adequate
notice to those whose pecuniary interests were at stake, the claims in the action could not be
enjoined.
C. In re Ex-Cel Concrete Company, Inc.
In In re Ex-Cel Concrete Company, Inc.,54 a couple and the business they owned both
filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.55 The business held a secondary lien on the couple’s home.56
The primary lien was a mortgage held by Citicorp.57 The bankruptcy cases were eventually
converted to chapter 7 liquidations, and the trustee of the couple’s estate attempted to sell the
couple’s home free and clear of the liens that existed in the business bankruptcy case.58 Notice
was given to an individual attorney that represented Citicorp in prior bankruptcy cases, but did
not represent Citicorp in either the personal or business bankruptcy cases.59 Additionally, this
attorney was not even in the country at the time notice was given.60
Citicorp did not become aware of the hearings or the sale until two weeks after the sale
order had been entered.61 Citicorp filed a motion to set aside the sale, and the court held
subsequent hearings on whether the motion should be granted.62 The court ultimately denied

53 Id. See also 11 U.S.C. 363(b)(1) (“The Trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in
the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . .”).
54 178 B.R. 198 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1995)
55 Id. at 199-200.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 200.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 201.
62 Id.
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Citicorp’s motion, holding that notice was sufficient and that the balance of equities favored the
purchasers of the home.63
On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel found that notice was both constitutionally
and statutorily deficient. First, several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code provided that a sale
order could only be approved after notice and hearing.64 Because the Bankruptcy Code was
designed to provide assurances to lien holders that they would receive timely notice prior to any
sale, “the trustee failed to pass even the threshold of [the Bankruptcy Code’s] requirements.”65
Second, service of process on an attorney that has represented a party before but was no longer
doing so was insufficient to satisfy constitutional procedural due process requirements, even if
that lawyer had forwarded the notice to the client.66 Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel voided the sale order and remanded the case back to the bankruptcy court for further
proceedings.67
III. Current State of the Law.
While procedural due process notice requirements are flexible, certain principles are
nearly universal and readily applicable. Contrary to GM’s assertions in Motors Liquidation,
procedural due process requirements do apply in bankruptcy cases.68 There are pecuniary
interests at stake in bankruptcy litigation, and the Fifth Amendment gives stakeholders the right
to have an opportunity to be heard and have their interests addressed. Not only does the due

63 Id. at 201-02.
64 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004(a) (“Notice of a proposed use, sale, or lease of property, other than cash collateral, not
in the ordinary course of business shall be given pursuant to Rule 2002(a)(2), (c)(1), (i), and (k) and, if applicable, in
accordance with § 363(b)(2) of the Code.)” See also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004(c); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014 (reasonable
notice and opportunity for hearing shall be afforded the party against whom relief is sought. No response is required
under this rule unless the court directs otherwise.)
65 Ex-Cel Concrete, 178 B.R. at 202-03.
66 See id. at 203-04.
67 Id. at 205.
68 Motors Liquidation, 529 B.R at 550.
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process clause mandate this result, but several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code provide that
action can only be taken upon notice and hearing.69
This notice must be delivered in a manner most likely to reach the potential
stakeholder.70 It may very well be that actual notice by mail would be impractical under the
circumstances.71 The stakeholders may be so numerous or hold claims of so little value that
notice by mail may not be economically feasible.72 In those instances, notice by publication
may be the most appropriate way to reach those with an interest in the outcome of the
litigation.73
Notice must also give the stakeholder adequate information about the proceedings at hand
so that the stakeholder can decide to “appear or default, acquiesce, or contest.”74 Again, with
interests in property at stake, notice that inadequately describes the impending proceedings does
not sufficiently inform an individual of what the consequences to their interests can be.
However, the complication comes with Mullane’s holding that individuals in a class can
make arguments on behalf of the whole class, even if not every member of the class received
appropriate notice.75 In order to succeed in showing prejudice, the members receiving
inadequate notice will have to prove that the bankruptcy court “got it wrong” in some sense,
either by other objectors failing to bring case law to the court’s attention, pointing to statutory
authority that would have mandated a different result, or suggesting any other way the result
would have otherwise been different had they received notice at an appropriate time.76 Mere

69 Ex-Cel Concrete, 178 B.R. at 202-03; See also 11 U.S.C. 363(b)(1) (“The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may
use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . .”).
70 Motors Liquidation, 529 B.R. at 566.
71 Fogel, 221 F. 3d at 962.
72 Id. at 963.
73 Id.
74 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
75 Id. at 319.
76 Motors Liquidation, 529 B.R. at 567.
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speculation as to other factors that might have changed things is not enough.77 This is a
particularly steep hurdle to climb.
Conclusion
Meeting procedural due process requirements can be complicated. Even a bankruptcy as
large and complex as GM’s could involve circumstances where mass mailings to stakeholders
are needed to adequately ensure that those interests can be protected if they so choose. It is also
the case that notice given to even one individual, who then appears at a hearing and presents an
argument that all others would have made, may be enough to safeguard all from the harms of
ineffective or improper notice. That being said, selectively mailing notices also increases the
risk that those who are due actual notice by mail may be able to attack orders entered by the
courts on the grounds that they received inadequate notice and the results would have been
different had they had the opportunity to appear and argue their case. The Motors Liquidation
case is a clear example of that risk, with certain classes of plaintiffs able to succeed in claiming a
violation of their procedural due process rights.78 Wisdom would caution the debtor-inpossession to cast the widest net possible in serving notice on potentially interested parties for
the sake of protecting any final order entered into by the bankruptcy court.

77 Id. at 568.
78 Id. at 570.
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